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THE THIRD VIEW OF THE STATUS OF OUR
NEW POSSESSIONS.
For the first time since the discussion as to the legal and con-
stitutional status or Puerto Rico and the Philippines arose, a thor-
oughly intelligent and forceful argument has been advanced in favor
of the "imperialist" contention. That argument is found in Mr.
Abbott Lawrence Lowell's article on "The Status of Our New Pos-
sessions-A Third View," published in the November number of
the Harvard Law Review.'
Mr. Lowell's view, briefly stated, is as follows: Neither the
proposition that the power of Congress over the territories of the
United States is absolutely unqualified by any constitutional re-
striction, nor the opposing doctrine that the limitations imposed by
the United States Constitution upon the federal government apply
wherever the jurisdiction of that government extends, harmonizes
with commonly received opinion or accords with all the United
States Court decisions, while the latter proposition is open to the
further objection that it makes well nigh impossible the govern-
ment of our new possessions properly acquired, and so may be
called irrational. A third view is therefore necessitated, namely:
"The theory, therefore, which best interprets the Constitution in the
light of history, and which accords most completely with the au-
thorities, would seem to be' that territory may be so annexed as to
make it a part of the United States, and that if so, all the general
restrictions in the Constitution apply to it, save those on the organ-
ization of the judiciary; but that possessions may also be so ac-
quired as not to form part of the United States, and in that case
constitutional limitations, such as those requiring uniformity of
taxation and trial by jury, do not apply." 2 It is all a matter of
treaty provision. In the case of Louisiana, Florida, California, the
territory included in the Gadsen Purchase and Alaska, there were
express treaty provisions giving to the inhabitants of the ceded ter-
ritory, with the exception in the case of Alaska of the uncivilized
native tribes, "the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and im-
munities of the United States," and as respects all the territory of
'13 Harv. Law Rev. 155.
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the United States ceded by treaties containing such express pro-
visions the limitations imposed by the United States Constitution
on the federal government have been held by "the overwhelming
weight of judicial authority" to apply, and of course do apply.
"But the recent treaty with Spain makes no such provision. It
merely cedes Puerto Rico and the Philippines to this country with-
out any stipulation in regard to the relation in which the islands or
their inhabitants shall stand towards the United States. In fact,
the ninth article-after providing that Spanish subjects, natives of
the Peninsula and residing in the ceded territory, may preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain, or renounce it-substitutes for the
clause in the earlier treaties, that in the latter case they shall acquire,
or be admitted to the rights of citizens of the United States, the pro-
vision that they shall be held 'to have adopted the nationality of the
territory in which they may reside;' and adds, 'The civil rights and
political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby
ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.'
Hence it is clear that if the government can acquire possessions
without making them a part of the United States, it has done so in
this case." 3 It can so acquire possessions. The authority show-
ing that this is so, and that the limitations of the Federal Constitu-
tion do not apply in Puerto Rico and the Philippines. is meagre. but
is found in a dictum of Mr. Justice Johnson in The American. etc.,
Ins. Co.'s v. 356 Bales of Cotton, i Peters 517 note, and in the cases
of Fleming v. Page, 9 How. 603, and In Re Ross 140 U. S. 453.
Mr. Lowell's doctrine outlined above has certain unsatisfactory
features. The most striking is that he-is loath to extend it as far as
logically he ought to do. "It may well be," he remarks at the close
of his article, "that some (constitutional) provisions have a universal
bearing because they are in form restrictions upon the power of
Congress rather than reservations of rights. Such are the pro-
visions that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed,
that no title of nobility shall be granted, and that a regular state-
ment and account of all public moneys shall be published from time
to time. These rules stand upon a different footing from the rights
guaranteed to the citizens, many of which are inapplicable except
among a people whose social and political evolution has been con-
sonant with our own." 4 Such a position is logically indefensible.
Every reservation or guarantee of rights in the Federal Constitution
is in fact, if not in form, a restriction upon the power of Congress,
'13 Harv. Law Rev. M71, 172.
13 Harv. Law Rev. 176.
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and in constitutional interpretation it is fact, not form that controls.
When it is sought to relieve the legislation of Congress, applicable
to any territory from constitutional restrictions, the only possible
theory on which to do it is that the Constitution does not apply at
all to such territory, unless Congress decrees that it shall. Ex post
facto laws are no more forbidden by the Constitution than is lack
of uniformity in taxation, and the right to the publication of regular
statements and accounts of public moneys is no more guaranteed
than is the right to trial by jury. Congress either has unlimited
scope in dealing with the personal and property rights of Puerto
Ricans and Filipinos in their respective islands, or its power is
restricted by all the limitations provided in the Federal Constitu-
tion which are in terms of general application.
MNr. Lowell's argument against "the broader construction which
extends the provisions of the Constitution over our new dependen-
cies" is that it contradicts the authorities he cites, and besides "is
irrational, because it extends the restrictions of the Constitution to
conditions where they cannot 'be applied without rendering the
government of our new dependencies well nigh impossible."
"Surely," he adds, "no provision ought to be given an interpretation
which leads to an irrational result, if the language will bear equally
well a different construction." 5 In other words, he impliedly as-
serts that any construction of the Federal Constitution which makes
that instrument forbid us to do what it may be expedient for us to
do, or even what we want to do, is irrational and to be avoided.
It is elementary, however, that the only reason for having prohibi-
tions in the Federal Constitution is to prevent Congress from doing
many things which might be expedient, or which Congress might
and probably would want to do, and that in determining the constitu-
tionality of any legislation questions of expediency or desirability
are wholly irrelevant, except in the rare case where the uncertainty
of the language used in the Constitution creates a genuine doubt as
to its real meaning and application. The only thing for Congress or
the court to do in a given case is to ascertain the true meaning and
application of the Constitution and then see that full effect is given
to all its provisions, whether they be positive or negative. Any
other course of procedure would be wholly irrational in the real
sense of the word.
Another unsatisfactory feature of Mr. Lowell's argument is that
the authorities which he cites to support his contention are not only,
as he admits, "meagre ;" they are not even at all in point.
a13 Harv. Law Rev. 157.
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The opinion of Mr. Justice Johnson in Amer., etc., Ins. Co.'s v.
Canter or 356 Bales of Cotton, i Peters 517 n., is pure obiter dicta
to begin with, for on appeal from his decision in that case the
United States Supreme Court expressly decided that the treaty
with Spain, by its very terms, admitted the inhabitants of Florida
to the enjoyment of the privileges, rights and immunities of the
citizens of the United States, and that, therefore, "it is unnecessary
to inquire whether this is not their condition independent of stipula-
tion." 6 Moreover, Mr. Justice Johnson announced a doctrine
which has since been repudiated by the United States Supreme
Court, and which Mr. Lowell himself disowns. The original thir-
teen States, the Northwest territory, and future States to be ad-
mitted, are not the only ones entitled to the guarantees of the Fed-
eral Constitution, i. e., are not, as Mr. Justice Johnson said they
were, "the sole objects of the Constitution; treaty provisions as well
as Congressional legislation have given and can give newly ac-
quired territories the benefit of those guarantees prior to Statehood.
In Fleming v. Page, 9, How. 603, the territory had not been
and, in fact, never has been ceded to the United States by treaty,
so the case could not be in point. The case of Fleming v. Page
rightly holds that enemy's country which is occupied by Federal
troops during a war, does not by virtue of that occupation become
a part of the United States, even though under the rules of inter-
national law and comity, other nations must act as if it does; for
the reason that every nation holds and acquires territory accord-
ing to its own institutions and laws, that our relations with con-
quered territory do not depend upon the law of nations, but upon
our own Constitution, and the acts of the proper authorities there-
under, that under our Constitution the power to enlarge the limits
of the United States is not given to the President as military com-
mander, but to the treaty making power, or the legislative authority,
and that the limits of the United States cannot be enlarged, except
by treaty or Congressional legislation. The Court was not con-
'i Peters W.
'Taney, C. J., in delivering the opinion of the court, in Fleming v. Page,
said: "The port of Tampico, at which the goods were shipped (to the United
States) and the Mexican State of Tamaulipas, in which it is situated, were
undoubtedly at the time of the shipment subject to the sovereignty and
dominion of the United States. The Mexican authorities had been driven
out or had submitted to our army and navy; and the country was in the
exclusive and firm possession of the United States, and governed by its
military authorities, acting under the orders of the President. But it does
not follow that it was a part of the United States, or that it ceased to be
a foreign country in the sense in which those words are used in the acts of
Congress. * * *
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cerned with a case where there was a treaty of cession, and it would
clearly have made a difference, according to the principle enunci-
ated in the opinion, if the sovereignty over Tampico had been ceded
by a treaty. Apart from treaty or legislation. possessions acquired
by conquest or cession do not become a part of the United States,
"The United States, it is true, may extend its boundaries by conquest
or treaty, and may demand the cession of territory as the condition of peace,
in order to indemnify its citizens for the injuries they have suffered,
or to reimburse the government for the expenses of the war. But this can be
done only by the treaty-making power or the legislative authority, and is not a
part of the power conferred upon the President by the declaration of war.
His duty and his power are purely military. * * * He may invade the
hostile country and subject it to the sovereignty and authority of the United
States. But his conquests do not enlarge the boundaries of this Union, nor
extend the operation of our institutions and lavs beyond the limits before
assigned to them by the legislative power.
"It is true that when Tampico had been captured and the State of
Tamaulipas subjugated, other nations were bound to regard the country,
while our possession continued, as the territory of the United States, and
to respect it as such. * * * As regarded all other nations it was a part
of the United States, and belonged to them as exclusively as the territory
included in our established boundaries.
"But yet it was not a part of this Union. For every nation which acquires
territory by treaty or conquest holds it according to its own institutions
and laws. And the relation in which the port of Tampico stood to the United
States, while it was occupied by their arms. did not depend upon the laws
of nations, but upon our own Constitution and acts of Congress. The power
of the President under which Tampico and the State-of Tamaulipas were
conquered and held in subjection, was simply that of a military commander
prosecuting a war waged against a public enemy by the authority of his gov-
ernment. • * * But the boundaries "of the United States, as they
existed when war was declared against Mexico, were not extended by
the conquest; nor could they be regulated by the varying instances of war
and be enlarged or diminished, as the armies on either side advanced or
retreated. They remained unchanged. * * *
"And the constituted authorities to whom the power of making war and con-
cluding peace is confided, and of determining whether a conquered country shall be
permanently retained or not, neither claimed nor exercised any rights or powers
in relation to the territory in question, but the rights of war. After it was sub-
dued it was uniformly treated as an enemy's country and restored to the pos-
session of the Mexican authorities when peace was concluded. And certainly
its subjugation did not compel the United States, while they held it, to regard it as
a part of their doninicns, nor to give to it any form of civil government, nor to
extend to it our laws. * * * Our own Constitution and form of government must
be our only guide. And we are entirely satisfied that under the Constitution
and laws of the United States, Tampico was a foreign port within the mean-
ing of the Act of 1846, when these goods were shipped (from there to the
United States), and that the cargos were liable to the duty charged upon
them" (on their arrival at Philadelphia).
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but that is simply a reiteration of the general doctrine that prop-
erty must be accepted to be acquired, and is but another wa.y of
saying that under our Constitution such acceptance is evidenced
only when embodied in treaty or Congressional legislation. In
Fleming v. Page there was neither, and the case is undoubtedly
right.
The case of In Re Ross, 140 U. S. 453, presents a very different
question. There we had a treaty, but it was a treaty which gave
us permission to exercise certain rights in territory which was in
no sense a part of the United States, and the Supreme Court of the
United States expressly based the decision upon the ground that
the Federal Constitution can have no operation in territory not
owned by the United States. The language of the court in that
case is as follows:
"By the Constitution, a government is ordained and established
'for the United States of America,' and not for countries outside
of their limits. The guarantees it affords against accusation of
capital or infamous crimes, except by indictment or presentment
by a grand jury, and for an impartial trial by a jury when thus
accused, apply only to citizens and others within the United
States, or who are brought there for trial for alleged offenses com-
mitted elsewhere, and not to residents or temporary sojourners
abroad. The Constitution can have no operation in aowthr country."
The case of In Re Ross is, of course, suggestive, as showing in
the words of Mr. Lowell, that "although the legislative power of
Congress might extend beyond the limits of the United States,
the limitations imposed upon legislation for the benefit of indi-
viduals did not accompany and restrain it," but it attempts to con-
clude and does conclude nothing whatever about territory owned
in full sovereignty by the United States.
But the most unsatisfactory feature of Mr. Lowell's argument
is that he overlooks the fact, and all that it implies, that under the
treaty with Spain the United States takes the entire and exclusive
sovereignty over Puerto Rico and the Philippines. His argument
assumes that because the treaty with Spain does not stipulate what
the legal rights of the native inhabitants of the ceded islands shall
be, but leaves "the civil rights and political status" of those inhabit-
ants to be determined by Congress, therefore we have a situation
essentially different from the conditions which have heretofore
confronted us under treaties ceding territory to the United States.
'140 U. S., Field. J. (35 Lawyers' Coop. P. Co.'s Ed. p. 586).
'x3 Harv. Law Rev. 17s.
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The treaty, however, does not say that such civil rights and politi-
cal status shall be determined by Congress unrestrained by any
constitutional limitations, or that the ceded islands shall not be
regarded as part of the United States, and in fact does not really
seem to differ in any essential from the Hawaiian Joint Resolutions,
which provide that the Hawaiian Islands "be and they are hereby
annexed as a part of the territory of the United States," and which
seem to Mr. Lowell to stand on the same footing as our earlier
treaties. It is a great mistake to say that it is clear that if the gov-
ernment can acquire possessions without making them a part of
the United States, it has done so in the case of Puerto Rico and the
Philippines. The fact is that it has done so in the case of Cuba,
but not in that of Puerto Rico or the Philippines. A glance at the
treaty will make this clear. The following articles of the treaty
and parts of articles bear directly on the question. 0
"ARTICLE I.
"Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to
Cuba.
"And as the island is, upon the evacuation by Spain, to be
occupied by the United States, the United States will, so long as
such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obligations
that may under international law result from the fact of its occu-
pation, for the protection of life and property.
"ARTICLE II.
"Spain cedes to the United States the island of Puerto Rico anal
.other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies,
and the island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones.
"ARTICLE III.
"Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the
Philippine Islands. * * *
"The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million
dollars ($2o,oooooo) within three months after the exchange of the
ratification of the present treaty.
"ARTICLE VIII.
"In conformity with the provisions of Articles I, II and III of
this treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba and cedes in Puerto Rico
and other islands in the West Indies, in the island of Guam, and in
the Philippine Archipelago, all the buildings, wharves, barracks,
0 30 U. S. Stat. at Large, p. 1755 ff.
STATUS OF OUR NEW POSSESSIONS.
forts, structures, public highways, and other immovable property
which in conformity with law belong to the public domain and as
such belong to the Crown of Spain. * * *
"In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may
be, are also included such rights as the Crown of Spain and its
authorities possess in respect of the official archives and records,
executive as well as judicial, in the islands above referred to which
relate to said islands or the rights and property of their inhabit-
ants. * * *
"ARTICLE IX.
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the
territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or
cedes her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may remove
therefrom * * * In case they remain in the territory,
they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by mak-
ing before a court of record within a year from the date of exchange
of ratification of this treaty a declaration of their decision to pre-
serve such allegiance, in default of which declaration they shall be
held to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they
may reside.
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants
of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be deter-
mined by the Congress.
"ARTICLE XVI.
."It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty
by the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time
of its occupancy thereof; but it will upon the termination of such
occupancy, advise any government established in the island to
assume the same obligations."
It will be noticed that the important words in the foregoing are
"relinquish" and "cede." Cuba is relinquished; Puerto Rico and
the Philippines are ceded. The meaning of both words is plain.
By having Spain simply relinquish Cuba, and by becoming our-
selves responsible for the island as provided in the treaty, we aimed
to make Cuba a sort of possession or charge without its becoming
part of the United States, or entitled to the benefit of our Constitu-
tion or general laws; and by having Spain cede Puerto Rico and the
Philippines we intended to change a military occupation into
acquisition and to make the islands an integral part of the United
States. Both objects seem to have been accomplished. There
would seem to be no room to doubt that Cuba is in exactly the
same legal situation with reference to our Constitution and laws
as was the State of Tamaulipas in the case of Fleming v. Page,
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supra; and while the treaty merely says of Puerto Rico and the
Philippines, that they, and all public property with them, are ceded
to the United States, that would seem to make them a part of the
United States, and thereby bdund and privileged by its Constitu-
tion and general laws. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall :"
"The usage of the world is, if a nation be not entirely subdued,
to consider the holding of conquered territory as a mere military
occupation until its fate shall be determined at the treaty of peace.
If it be ceded by the treaty, the acquisition is confirmed, and the ceded
territory becomes a part of the nation to which it is annexed; either on
the terms stipulated in the treaty of cession or such as its new master
shall impose. On such transfer of territory it has never been held
that the relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any
change. Their relations with their former sovereign are dissolved
and new relations are created between them and the government
which has acquired their territory. The same act which transfers
their country, transfers the allegiance of those who remain in it
(in the absence of treaty stipulations to the contrary); and the law
which may be denominated political is necessarily changed,
although that which regulates the intercourse and general conduct
of individuals remains in force until altered by the newly created
power of the State."
By the phrase "the law which may be denominated political,"
Chief Justice Marshall, of course, meant to cover Constitutional
law. Puerto Rico and the Philippines are as much a part of the
United States and as much subject to and protected by the Federal
Constitution as was the Louisiana purchase, or has been any other
territorial acquisition in our past history.
It is, of course, quite conceivable that the United States may go
a few steps farther than it has gone in the case of Cuba, and may
some day, by treaty, acquire territory for a naval station, or for .
some other restricted purpose, or even for general purposes, and
may in the treaty of cession provide that the ceded territory is not
intended to be and shall not be regarded as a part of the United
States, though subject to its full and exclusive sovereignty, that its
inhabitants shall remain citizens of the ceding State, that neither
they nor their descendants shall ever become citizens of the United
States or entitled to any of the guarantees of the Federal Constitu-
'Amer., etc., Ins. Co.'s v. 356 Bales of Cotton, i Peters app. 54.
' Here the treaty has saved to Spain the allegiance of all "Spanish sub-
jects, natives of the Peninsula," in ceded and relinquished territory, who
within a fixed time make a prescribed declaration of their intention to pre-
serve such allegiance.
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tion, unless otherwise specially provided by Congressional legisla-
tion, and then only as so specified; and it is quite conceivable that
such a treaty would be given effect to in all its provisions by the
United States Supreme Court on the ground that such provisions
are legitimately within the scope of the treaty making powers, and
that such powers are, under the Constitution, of a higher grade than
are the limitations of the Constitution. 3  The real value of Mr.
Lowell's article lies in the suggestion of such a possibility and of
its reasonableness. But such a case is not the one we have under
discussion. We are dealing simply with a case where the territory
is ceded to the United States for all purposes for which the United
States can receive it, and everything is left to Congress to regulate
under its Constitutional powers, whatever they may be. Surely,
then, there is no Constitutional reason for regarding Congress as
having greater powers over such territory than it has been held to
have over territory acquired under prior treaties, and we may con-
fidently assert that it has no greater power. On principle and on
authority, the provisions of the United States Constitution extend
over Puerto Rico and the Philippines, and will so extend until we
get rid of these islands.
" "This Constitution and the laws of the United States, which shall be
made in pursuance thereof, and all. treaties made, or which shall be made
under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the
land." U. S. Const., Article IV.
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